BACK in 2010, when the new coalition government unveiled its Strategic Security and Defence Review (SSDR); there was a lot of bad news for the military.
Deep cuts were ordered. Many of those cuts made little sense like the axing of Nimrod, the UK’s only maritime patrol aircraft. The decision to kill it off came at the end of a protracted and much-delayed gestation. It had cost billions. The government’s solution, even though aircraft were complete and about to enter service, was to scrap them. Within days, wrecking crews destroyed the airframes. No going back there.
Warship numbers were cut. Useful frigates were slated for disposal. Little thought was given to their sophisticated and secret listening gear which made them prime assets for the Royal Navy. Fortunately one survived long enough to fulfil a vital role in the toppling of Colonel Gaddafi.
The high-profile casualty of the SSDR was HMS ARK ROYAL. Not long out of refit, and equipped with the most advanced command control and communications equipment, she was quickly decommissioned. Not placed into mothballs, but put on a disposal list, essentially up for sale for scrap to the highest bidder. Her equipment was removed and her hull gutted to a point where a return to service would be impossible without a lengthy and expensive refit.
Her Harrier jets, though not perfect, were the United Kingdom’s only rapidly deployable strike jets. Able to operate from land, or from Ark Royal and her sister ship Illustrious, they gave the UK a flexible, independent strike capability. The Harriers were retired, broken into pieces, crated up and sold as spares to the United States – still a believer in – and user of Harrier along with the navies of India, Spain, Italy, and Thailand.
We were told at the time, the absence of carrier strike represented a “capability holiday.” Political spin speak for a gap in military punch that would leave the UK unable to operate aircraft in an offensive way without either being in range of the UK, or in range of nations which would allow us to operate from their bases.
There was though a sweetener.
The new carriers on order were to operate the Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the new F-35 aircraft, known as the F-35B.
A complex bit of kit, the B model of the F-35 is, like the Harrier before it, able to land vertically – in the same way a helicopter lands. It uses complex technology to do this, and as a result, it cannot carry as much fuel or as many weapons as the F-35C.
For all the aircraft’s complexity, the business of launching it from a ship is simple. Like the Harrier, it is lined-up on the deck and – using its –own power – rolls down a runway to an angled ramp which assists it into the air. A low-tech but very effective way of launching an aircraft. On return, the F-35B hovers alongside the ship, then lands on to the deck like a helicopter. This way of operating an aircraft frees up other parts of the flight deck during landing operations and it is less prone to problems caused by heavy seas, and other adverse weather. It will be the aircraft of choice for the US Marine Corps, and other navies currently using Harrier.
The C model – selected for use by the United States Navy on its future aircraft carriers – is a conventional but hi-tech aircraft. Conventional, because it lands like a traditional jet, and when operated off a ship needs a catapult to launch it, and arrestor wires to stop it when it lands back on board. The upside of this arrangement known as Catapult Assisted Take off Barrier Arrested Recovery, (CATOBAR) is that the F-35C has a greater range, and can carry more weapons.
As part of the defence review, the UK government announced it was to buy the C model of the F-35, rather than the B, giving the UK military a much better aircraft.
An expensive, but welcome decision. Expensive, because the two carriers under construction for the Royal Navy would have to be reconfigured to carry the catapults and wires needed to operate the aircraft. A redesign which would delay the two ships’ entry into service. A redesign which would see the UK having to jump into the American production run for the catapults. A redesign which would mean more crew in the ships, and more power requirements from the vessels’ generators, but which would result in more capable carriers.
The new CATOBAR carriers would be more flexible. They could operate other types fast jet, like the French Rafale or the American Super Hornet. Much play was made at the time of the UK’s new found friendship with France – with its CATOBAR carrier. The other upside for the Royal Navy was that it gave it greater choice when selecting other aircraft to operate of its decks. The RN’s aged but technologically capable Sea King helicopters which provide the fleet with Airborne Surveillance and Control, (ASaC) are coming to the end of their lives. A replacement could now potentially be sourced from the USA using second-hand but capable E2 fixed-wing aircraft. Fixed-wing aeroplanes have a simple advantage over a helicopter; they can fly higher and for longer. For an aircraft that has to carry radar aloft, height and endurance are distinct advantages.
There were downsides to the plan. The first and most noticeable was the instant end to cooperation between the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. For decades, with the Harrier as a common aircraft, the US and UK had worked hand-in-glove. Joint training and crew exchanges were part of the fabric of the Marine Corps and the UK Harrier community. Shortly after the British Government announced the end of Harrier operations, the relationship between the USMC and UK military ceased. British pilots on exchange were sent home almost immediately. From the USMC’s point of view, there was now no point in investing time in working with the British. They were out of the STOVL aircraft game.
The UK, faced with the prospect of future conventional carrier operations, soon made new friends. It was December 1978, when the Royal Navy last launched an aircraft from a CATOBAR carrier. The way of operating, the whole doctrine behind conventional carrier operations – although invented by the British – was binned and forgotten in an instant.
30-plus years of experience had to be quickly acquired and former Harrier pilots where hastily put on crash courses in French in preparation for training with the French Navy. Simulators were re-programmed so British pilots could get experience in landing on a conventional carrier. Training slots were found in the States for former British Harrier pilots, while United States Navy carrier specialists were brought to the UK to begin the long task of training personnel in conventional carrier operations.
The move was also a win for the RAF. Desperately looking for a replacement for both Harrier and the Tornado bomber fleet, the F-35C fitted the bill perfectly.
And now the Cameron government, so critical of its predecessor for wasting money on defence projects, has announced a U-turn. The new aircraft carriers will be built to the original specification. Not catapults, not arrestor wires, not the F-35C. Instead, it is back to plan “A” with the STOVL F-35B, and carriers with ramps on their bows.
The estimated cost of this change of mind. £40M
£40M that could have paid for the refit of a frigate. £40M that could have helped keep Ark Royal and her Harrier jets in service.
The fact is, the government made a snap decision without proper thought to the consequences. This makes one wonder about the validity of other decisions it has made since 2010.
The conversion of the two new carriers to CATOBAR would have added about £5BN to their already over-budget building costs. Though not yet complete, both ships would have had 290 internal spaces altered to accommodate catapult and arrestor gear. At the time of the SSDR, the bill for that work was estimated at £2BN for both ships. Again, this only raises more questions about the accuracy of the Cameron government’s accounting and the quality of its decision making.
The work would have also delayed HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS PRINCE OF WALES’ commissioning by something like 36 months.
Of this U-Turn, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond says, “The 2010 SSDR decision was right at the time, but the facts have changed, and therefore so must our approach. This government will not blindly pursue projects and ignore cost growth and delays. Carrier strike with “cats and traps” using the carrier variant jet no longer represents the best way of delivering carrier strike and I am not prepared to tolerate a three year further delay to reintroducing our carrier strike capability. This announcement means we remain on course to deliver carrier strike in 2020.”
That makes perfect sense. But we were told to believe the decisions in the SSDR in 2010 made perfect sense. It hardly inspires confidence.
Politics aside, it is about steel being cut, crews being trained, and aircraft entering service. This decision has – like most decisions – good and bad points.
First the bad points:
• The RAF will not get as capable an aircraft. The F-35B replaces Harrier and will probably be the replacement for Tornado. The vertical landing capability is a big part of the aircraft and its bulk and weight means it cannot operate as far, or carry as many weapons as a conventional aeroplane. As an RAF jet, it will be land-based for a lot of its life. The STOVL role will not be necessary for anything but carrier operations, and as outlined above, the pay-off, is reduced capability and performance.
• Our new carriers will now only be able to operate one type of fixed-wing aircraft. Apart from Harrier – which the UK has scrapped – there are no western jets that use ski-jumps to assist take-off and hovering to land.
• The decision narrows the Royal Navy’s choice for a future ASaC Aircraft. Whatever system is chosen, it will now have to fit into a helicopter with its height and endurance limitations.
• Expensive aircrew have effectively wasted 2 years’ training on conventional carriers, acquiring skills that are no-longer needed.
• One imagines lots of favours were called-in with the US Navy to get British crew onto training programmes. UK personnel will have been shoe-horned into courses on aircraft operation and been given know-how on catapult and arrestor wire systems. At best, the UK will have annoyed the United States Navy. One hopes there are no hard feelings, and the inconvenience caused will be put down to politics and soon forgotten.
The good points:
• STOVL as a concept works for the Royal Navy. The UK invented it. The Harrier was a British aeroplane, and the Royal Navy with its ski-jump equipped Invincible Class carriers was the first nation to take this innovative jet to sea. The RN developed the doctrine behind it, the techniques needed to make the aircraft work. It was the UK that proved the concept for real with Harrier jets flown from ships during the 1982 Falklands conflict. In short, the RN does jump jets.
• Launch and recovery of STOVL jets is simpler quicker and safer, as outlined above.
• Conventional carriers also need their jets to be configured as tankers. They have to provide fuel to other aircraft in-flight. This is not done as a form of range extension. It is done as a safety measure for aircraft low on fuel which fail to snag an arrestor wire during a landing attempt. The very nature of an aircraft carrier means the options for a low on fuel jet unable to land on deck are few. Divert airfields are rarely available. With STOVL operations, this need ceases to exist, as does the need for extra crew to man catapults, and arrestor gear.
• The CATOBAR plan would have left the Royal navy with one of its new carriers capable of carrying nothing more than helicopters. Only one ship, Prince of Wales would have been given the catapults and arrestor gear to start with. First of Class, Queen Elizabeth was destined for either a life in reserve or at best, a retrofit conversion later in her career. This U-turn now means there is the potential to get both ships to sea at times of emergency with air groups. At the very least, it means both ships will have a shared fast jet capability from day one.
So, the argument for the STOVL aircraft carrier with the F-35B jet has won the day. It may not be as capable as its conventionally-launched cousin, but as a piece of technology, is it years ahead of anything the Royal Navy has ever had. It is more than up to the job. The re-adoption of STOVL gives the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force a renewed commonality with the United States Marine Corps. Let us hope bridges burnt there with the demise of the UK Harrier force can be rebuilt.
A host of navies are now building or using helicopter carriers with the potential to operate the F-35B. The decision to stick with STOVL not only keeps the UK in the carrier game, but puts us at the forefront of a new era in seaborne power.
Please David Cameron, don’t change your mind again.